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RESTORING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM TO THE WORKPLACE:
TITLE VII, RFRA AND RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIGt
INTRODUCTION
Clashes between employers and employees over religious
observance in the workplace are an increasingly familiar feature in
the legal system. Accordingly, employees filed nearly 3000 charges
of religious discrimination with the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and with state and local agencies
in 1994-an increase of over thirty percent from 1990.1 Many of
these complaints involved employers' failures to accommodate the
religious beliefs of their employees.
The case law abounds with examples of the types of religious
observance for which employees might require accommodation. For
instance, the complaining employee may be a Sabbatarian, unable to
work on Saturdays or on Sundays.2 Alternatively, she may need to
t Sc.B., Brown University, 1993; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1996. Special
thanks go out to judge Arlin Adams, Professors Frank Goodman and Eugene Volokh,
and my peers Michael Baughman, David Elchoness and Chevanniese Smith for their
comments on earlier drafts.
I See Margaret A. Jacobs, Courts Wrestle with Religion in Workplace; WALL ST. J., Oct.
10, 1995, at B1; see also Debbie N. Kaminer & Harlan A. Loeb, Guidance Is Lacking on
Religious Accommodation, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 13, 1995, at C8, C8 ("As religion in pluralistic
America searches for its place, religious discrimination in employment is beginning
to emerge from the shadows of sexual harassment, affirmative action remedies and
wrongful termination in the panoply of Title VII claims that are filling the dockets.").
2 See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); TWA v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 68 (1977); Genas v. Department of Correctional Servs., No. 95-
7125, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2080, at *13 (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 1996); Beadle v. City of
Tampa, 42 F.3d 633 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995); Beadle v.
Hillsborough County Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 2001 (1995); Benton v. Carded Graphics, Inc., 28 F.3d 1208, No. 93-1675, 1994WL
249221 (4th Cir. June 9, 1994) (unpublished table decision); Lee v. ABF Freight Sys.,
Inc., 22 Ed 1019 (10th Cir. 1994); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 E3d 1375 (6th Cir.
1994); Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1993); Blair v. Graham Correctional Ctr.,
4 F.3d 996, No. 92-1597, 1993 WL 331886 (7th Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) (unpublished table
decision), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994); Wright v. Runyon, 2 F.3d 214 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1077 (1993); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 989 (1988); Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F2d
129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986); Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671
F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1982); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.
1979); Ward v. Allegheny Ludium Steel Corp., 560 E2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977).
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observe occasional holidays3 or attend religious functions. 4  Her
religion may require her to wear certain garb or maintain a certain
appearance, in conflict with an employer's dress code.5 She may
object to attending mandatory meetings in which her employer
conducts devotional services or exercises,6 or, in the converse, may
wish to conduct such services herself.7 She may oppose medical
diagnosis and treatment, which results in her above-average use of
sick days.8 Her beliefs may require that she live in a community with
an active church of her denomination.' She may oppose having to
sleep in the same room with a member of the opposite sex while on
duty.10  Her opposition to violence may render her unable to
perform occasional occupational tasks,1 or her religion may
3 See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 62-63 (1986) (school
teacher's religious beliefs required her to refrain from employment on designated
holy days causing her to miss more school days than allotted by the school board for
observance of religious holidays); Webb v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 57 F.3d 1067, No.
94-1784, 1995 WL 352485 (4th Cir. June 13, 1995) (unpublished table decision)
(employer denied sales representative's request for time off in observance of Yom
Kippur and Passover).
' See, e.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F3d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993) (employee's
attendance of the joint B'nai Mitzvah of his wife and son caused him to be fired
because he missed a mandatory meeting); DePriest v. Department of Human Servs.,
830 F2d 193, No. 86-5920, 1987 WL 44454, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1987) (unpublished
table decision) (employee's insistence on attending religious services led to the
termination of her employment); Howard v. Haverty Furniture Cos., 615 F.2d 203, 205
(5th Cir. 1980) (part-time Methodist minister's absence from warehousing job to
officiate at funeral resulted in his discharge); Redmond v. GAP Corp., 574 F.2d 897,
899 (7th Cir. 1978) (employee's inability to work Saturday overtime due to Bible-study
class attendance resulted in termination).
I See, e.g., Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995)
(employee's button with graphically depicted aborted fetus created tremendous
disruptions among co-workers, resulting in diminished productivity); United States v.
Board of Educ., 911 .2d 882, 894 (3d Cir. 1990) (female school teacher's Muslim
religious garb not permitted under Pennsylvania law); Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (male Sikh employee could not shave his beard
for religious reasons, inhibiting his ability to use a respirator in the event of an
accidental exposure to toxic gases).
6 See EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1077 (1989); Young v. Southwestern Say. and Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1975).
7 See Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
s See Riselay v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 929 F.2d 701, No. 90-1779,
1991 WL 44319 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 1991) (unpublished table decision) (Christian Scien-
tist's above-average use of sick-leave prompted employer to require documentation to
support future sick-leave).
9 See Vetter v. Farmland Indus., 901 F. Supp. 1446, 1449 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
10 See Miller v. Drennon, 966 F.2d 1443, No. 91-2166, 1992 WL 137578 (4th Cir.
June 19, 1992) (unpublished table decision) (male EMS worker working 24-hour shifts
required to sleep in EMS substation with female co-worker).
" See, e.g., Ryan v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 950 E2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991) (FBI
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prohibit the use of her social security number.12  Perhaps she is
fundamentally opposed to affiliation with labor organizations,13 or
more narrowly, objects to such affiliation based on particular
activities undertaken by her local union. 4 Her religious beliefs may
proscribe mandatory donation to charity.15 Her worship may
involve the use of controlled substances in violation of her
employer's policies, 6 or as in the most celebrated case of recent
months, she may object to standing at work during the national
anthem.
1 7
Some expressions of religious belief require more accommoda-
tion than others. Tile VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 sets the
standard that determines whether employers must provide certain
accommodations, or whether they may dismiss or discipline workers
when the employee's religious requirements would be too burden-
some to accommodate." The Court has narrowly interpreted the
statutory test of "undue hardship," 9 permitting the employer to
discharge the employee either when the employee's exercise of her
employee refused to investigate destruction of government property by anti-war
groups), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 958 (1992); American Postal Workers Union, San
Francisco Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1986) (postal worker
opposed to violence unable to process draft applications).
12 See, e.g., Hover v. Florida Power & Light Co., No. 93-14236, 1995 WL 91531 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 6, 1995) ("[T] he Plaintiff alleges that his religious beliefs prevent him from
using his social security number as 'the mark of the beast' and therefore is not
required to give that information to any employer....").
"3 See, e.g., McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 35 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
discharged by employer at the behest of the local union for refusing to pay her dues);
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 .2d 1239 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1098 (1981); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers, DAL.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445 (7th
Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
589 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
1 See EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 332 (6th Cir. 1990) (employee
objected to paying union dues where the union supported the pro-choice movement).
'- SeeYott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979) (mandatory
charity donation arose when employee refused to affiliate himself with labor
organization because of religious beliefs), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
'6 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (employee discharged
for sacramental use of peyote at a Native American church ceremony); Toledo v.
Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied 495 U.S. 948
(1990).
17 See, e.g.,Jim Hodges, Abdul-Rauf Wil Stand-and Pray, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996,
at Cl (professional basketball player refused to stand during the national anthem
claiming it violated his Muslim beliefs); Manny Topol, LegalIssues Cloudy/Contract Law
or Religion, NEWSDAY, Mar. 14, 1996, at A95 (same).
18 See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1994)).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ea) (1994).
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religion poses more than a de minimis cost to the employer, or when
accommodation would cause the employer to violate the law.
20
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA")
prohibits the Government-federal, state or local-from substantially
burdening an employee's free exercise of religion without a compel-
ling interest and a showing that the intrusive law is narrowly tailored
to achieve that compelling interest.2' Although RFRA does not
directly modify the standards of Title VII, 22 in an important class of
cases it will have substantial effect.
RFRA creates a presumption that government regulation is
unconstitutional when it substantially burdens an employee's
religious exercise. No longer will an employer's reliance on comply-
ing with an otherwise valid law or regulation be the end of an inquiry
into undue hardship. Instead, an employer's claim that some law
within the Government's regulatory power constrains its ability to
accommodate the employee triggers a RFRA analysis. Only if the
employer-or the Government as intervenor-can sustain the law
under RFRA as against the plaintiff-employee, is it reasonable for the
employer to refuse to accommodate the employee. Title VII is not
implicated by RFRA; instead, it is the labor law which "substantially
burden [s] a person's exercise of religion."
23
This Comment examines the requirements of Title VII in Part I.
Then, in Part II, the attention turns to the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment, and RFRA's impact on First Amendment
litigation in the context of employment discrimination. Last, Part III
illustrates the analysis by examining the effect of RFRA on the most
common area of Title VII religious-accommodation litigation, the
inflexibility of seniority provisions of collective bargaining agree-
ments to accommodate Sabbatarians. 24 In doing so, this Comment
will argue that RFRA is a landmark development for employees who
allege that their employers fail to reasonably accommodate their
religious beliefs and exercise.
20 See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76-80, 84-85 (1977).
21 See Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4
(1994)).
22 See S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1993), rerinted in 1993
U.S.C.CA.N. 1892, 1903 [hereinafter S. REP. NO. 111] ("Nothing in this act shall be
construed as affecting religious accommodation under title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.").
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (1994).
24 See Cary v. Carmichael, 908 . Supp. 1334, 1342 (E.D. Va. 1995)
("Sabbatarianism has been the most common religious belief causing conflict.").
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I. TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, religion and
national origin.2" In cases of alleged religious discrimination, "[a] n
employee establishes a prima facie case.., by showing that: (1) the
employee has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an
employment requirement; (2) the employee informed the employer
of this belief; (3) the employee was disciplined for failing to comply
with the conflicting employment requirement."26 Once the employ-
ee establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer
to show either that it offered any "reasonable accommodation"-and
not necessarily the employee's preferred accommodation-2 7 -or that
any potential accommodation would cause the employer "undue
hardship."
28
Despite the apparently forceful meaning of "undue hardship,"
29
the Supreme Court has interpreted the term so as to dampen the
' For background on Title VII, see generally MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAw 199-210 (Practitioner's ed., 1988).26 Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1340 (8th Cir. 1995); see also
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1986) (applying the same
standard).
I See Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68 ("[W]here the employer has already reasonably
accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The
employer need not further show that each of the employee's alternative accom-
modations would result in undue hardship.").
The employer and employee, however, do have a duty to cooperate to reach an
amicable solution. See, e.g., id. at 69 ("Senator Randolph, the sponsor of ...
[§ 2000e (j)] expressed his hope that accommodation would be made with 'flexibility'
and 'a desire to achieve an adjustment.' ... Consistent with these goals, courts have
noted that 'bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable
reconciliation .. . .'") (citation omitted); Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's
Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 593 (11th Cir. 1994) ("While we recognize an employer's duty to
reasonably accommodate the religious practices of its employee, we likewise recognize
an employee's duty to make a good faith attempt to accommodate his religious needs
through means offered by the employer."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995); Lee v.
ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The defendant's efforts
to reach a reasonable accommodation triggered Mr. Lee's duty to cooperate.").
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994) ("The term 'religion' includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business."); see also Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 63 n.I.
2 seeAMERICAN HERrrAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 619, 1473 (3d ed. 1993) (defining
"hardship" as "[a] cause of privation or suffering" and "undue" as "[e]xceeding what
is appropriate or normal"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (A) (1994) (defining "undue
hardship" for the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense").
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standard's force. 30 As one commentator has stated: "The Title VII
requirement that the secular employer reasonably accommodate the
religious practices of the employee has been utterly minimized by the
Court."" The Court did this in TWA v. Hardison,2 in which it
defined the monetary and nonmonetary thresholds that qualify as
"undue."3'
A. De Minimis Cost: Economics Causing Undue Hardship
In dollar terms, the Hardison Court held that undue hardship
represents anything more than de minimis cost. Following a
voluntary transfer that caused Larry Hardison to lose his seniority
under the collective bargaining agreement, his employer, TWA,
forced him to work Saturdays when another employee went on
vacation.34 Hardison proffered several proposed accommodations
to his employer. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found
two of the accommodations to be reasonable: "TWA would suffer no
undue hardship if it were required to replace Hardison either with
supervisory personnel or with qualified personnel from other
departments. Alternatively,... TWA could have replaced Hardison
on his Saturday shift with other available employees through the
payment of premium wages."35 Justice White, writing for the Court,
reversed the Eighth Circuit and rejected the accommodations: "Both
of these alternatives would involve costs to TWA, either in the form
SO See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 93 n.6 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("As
a matter of law, I seriously question whether simple English usage permits 'undue
hardship' to be interpreted to mean 'more than de minimis cost' ..... ).
s1 David L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis of the EEOC's
Proposed Guidelines, 56 MONT. L. REV. 119, 127 (1995) (arguing that Ansonia and
Hardison have made Tite VII "largely meaningless as a source of protection for the
religiously observant employee of the secular employer"); see also 1 CHARLEs A.
SULLVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 9.3.3, at 391 (2d ed. 1988) ("In
reading § 7010() so narrowly, the Supreme Court has clearly failed to fulfill the intent
of Congress.").
In contrast, the Title VII requirement of religious accommodation does not
extend to sectarian employers. Religious organizations may discriminate on the basis
of religion for employment in connection with their religious activities. See Gregory,
supra, at 127.
32 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
3s See id. at 84-85.
"4 See id. at 68 (describing the origins of Hardison's complaints). The "cost" of
violating the collective bargaining agreement-liability under the National Labor
Relations Act-is discussed infra Part I.B.
" Id. at 84. The plaintiff's position as clerk in an airline-maintenance facility
required staffing 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. As a result, it was necessary for
another employee to work in Hardison's stead. See id. at 66-67.
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of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages. To require TWA to
bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays
off is an undue hardship." 6 Justice Marshall, in dissent, noted the
trifling extent of the efficiency loss discussed by the Court: $150
total in overtime costs until Hardison would have regained enough
seniority to become "eligible to transfer back to his previous
department.""
Subsequent courts have attempted to distinguish between the
trivial costs that qualify as undue hardships, and the even more trivial
costs that do not. In Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 8 for
example, the Third Circuit distinguished Hardison on its facts:
"Volkswagen regularly maintained, along with employees assigned to
specific posts on the assembly line, a crew of roving absentee relief
operators (ARO) to be deployed as substitutes for absent employ-
ees." 9 The Protos court accepted the district court's conclusions
that the AROs were as efficient as Angeline Protos, and that "the
employer here was not obliged to pay higher wages in order to fill
Protos's vacancy."4" Yet, the efficiency costs can be attenuated, and
still represent an undue hardship. They can, for example, stem from
11 Id. at 84; see also 3 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 56.03[1]
(1995) (discussing the Hardison Court's focus on the cost to coemployees as a result
of favoring religious employees).
s1 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 92 n.6. Justice Marshall was probably justified in noting
the absurdity of the majority's definition. Although courts consider the loss of a day's
pay to the religious employee "insubstantial," see Pinsker v. Joint District No. 28J, 735
F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a school board's paid leave policy did not
substantially burden a Jewish teacher's rights under either Title VII or the First
Amendment when the policy required him to take occasional days of unpaid leave),
under Hardison much smaller costs are found to unduly burden the employer, the
party presumably better able to spread or absorb the cost.
3s 797 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986).
39 Id. at 135.
1 Id.; see also Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1979)
(finding that "no monetary costs and de minimus [sic] efficiency problems were
actually incurred during the three month period in which [the plaintiff] was
accommodated," and rejecting the employer's suggestion to examine the "'theoretical'
future effects" and costs of other Sabbatarians subsequentiy seeking similar
accommodation).
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"disruption of work routines, and a lowering of morale" among
coworkers.4 The willingness to find an undue hardship is height-
ened in cases in which public safety may be compromised by such
disruptions. 2
Labor unions are held to a somewhat higher standard than the
employers whose workers they represent;4 while most cases seem to
indicate that any monetary expense by an employer amounts to
undue hardship, even when those expenses are only a drop in the
bucket of the employer's revenues, courts have routinely found that
an employee's objection to union affiliation, and the consequential
loss to the union of that employee's dues, cannot constitute undue
hardship.44
" Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Brener's
characterization of complaints by others as mere grumbling underestimates the actual
imposition on other employees in depriving them of their shift preference at least
partly because they do not adhere to the same religion as Brener."); see also Wilson v.
U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding it unnecessary
to reach an undue hardship analysis because the employer reasonably accommodated
the plaintiff-employee whose insistence on wearing a graphic anti-abortion pin to work
caused disturbances and a loss of efficiency among her coworkers).
42 SeeBeadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F3d 633, 637 (11th Cir.) ("When the employer's
business involves the protection of lives and property, courts should go slow in
restructuring [the business's] employment practices." (quotation omitted)), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
11 Unions fall within the scope of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (c) (3) (1994)
(stating that it is an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization "to cause
or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of
this section"); see also 3 LARSON, supra note 36, § 56.07[3] (discussing the rationales
for unions to be subject to the "reasonable accommodation" requirement).
4" See, e.g., Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir.) ("The
Steelworkers have not established that the 'substituted charity' accommodation, as
applied here, will deprive the union of monies necessary for its maintenance or
operation."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers,
D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir.) ("Because a religious objector under a
charity-substitute accommodation bears the same financial burden as his co-workers,
he is not.., seeking something for nothing, and the diversion of his contribution to
a charity rather than the Union does not of itself make the accommodation unfair or
unreasonable as a matter of law."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); Burns v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978) ("In our view, the loss
of dues [in the amount of $19 per month] to the Union is de minimis, even if so
necessary to its fiscal well-being that its equivalent would be collected from the Local's
300 members at a rate of 2 cents each per month."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
But see Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 E2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979)
("Exemption [as opposed to paying the amount of union dues to charity] involves no
payment at all, and the history at Rockwell indicates friction has resulted from 'free-
riders' defined as those who pay neither union dues nor the equivalent thereof to a
charity."), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). In contrast to Burns, Hardison involved a
total cost of $150, likely to be substantially less than the cost in Burns, and was spread
through a much larger organization. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 92 n.6 (1977)
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B. Breaking the Law: Statutory Compliance Causing Undue Hardship
In contrast to an employer's defense that economic factors
cause undue hardship, the employer may claim that accommo-dation
would result in violation of a statute or regulation,
with the consequences of thatviolation constituting undue hard-ship.
Typically, as in Hardison, the employer invokes the sen-iority provisio-
ns of collective bargaining agreements, which are enforced by the
federal labor laws, to prevent the accommodation of Sabbatarians.45
As the Court explained in Hardison:
[W] e do not believe that the duty to accommodate requires TWA
to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement.
Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable
agreements between management and labor, lies at the core of our
national labor policy, and seniority provisions are universally
included in these contracts. Without a clear and express indication
from Congress, we cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that




The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), by comparison, expressly
looks to the resources of the employer as a factor in calculating undue hardship.
Factors used in determining undue hardship for accommodating a disabled employee
include: "(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision
of the reasonable accommodation ... ; (iii) the overall financial resources of the
covered entity [as a whole rather than on a particular plant] .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv) (1994).
1 See, e.g., Hardison, 432 U.S. at 76-77; Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019,
1022 (10th Cir. 1994); Blair v. Graham Correctional Ctr., 4 F.3d 996, No. 92-1597,
1993 WL 331886, at *2 (7th Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) (unpublished table decision), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994).
Title VII itself exempts neutral seniority provisions from its scope:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such
differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
1 Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79. For other Sabbatarian cases, see, e.g., ABFFreight Sys.,
22 F.3d at 1023 ("Nor does Title VII require an employer to violate a valid labor
agreement to accommodate an employee."); Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("Compelling [the coworker] Higgins to work involuntarily in Mann's place
would have contravened the seniority and [overtime shift-assignment] provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement and deprived Higgins of her contractual rights.
This proposed accommodation constitutes undue hardship."); Blair, 1993 WL 331886,
at **2 ("We are convinced that Graham's inability to accommodate Blair's scheduling
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Labor laws can interfere with an employee's exercise of religion
in contexts other than Sabbatarianism. For example, in one case, an
employee's religious beliefs prevented him from affiliating with the
labor union, and, furthermore, prevented him from mak-ing a mand-
atory donation to charity-the collective bargaining agreement's
alternative to paying dues for employees with relig-ious objections to
union affiliation.47 The Ninth Circuit held: "[E]xemption [from
paying union dues] ... requires such a substantial alteration in the
relationship between the parties and significant erosion of the
congressional purpose in permitting union security clauses that it
goes beyond reasonable accommodation." 41 G o v e r n m e n t
regulation outside the ambit of labor laws can also sometimes prevent
an employer from accommodating the religious needs of its
employees. Examples of this interference may include laws and
regulations concerning drug use,49 garb ° and grooming."'
II. RFRA: COMPELING INTERESTS TRUMPING UNDUE HARDSHIPS
A. An Overview of RFRA
In 1993 Congress passed with near-unanimity,52 and President
Clinton signed into law,53 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
request was ... [caused] by the constraints placed upon Graham by the collective
bargaining agreement and the demands of managing the security force . ").
47 See Yott, 602 F.2d at 906-07. Offering the alternative of a donation to charity will
presumptively make the accommodation reasonable, over the objection of the employ-
er or the union. See McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 38 (6th Cir. 1982)
(finding that the union violated Title VII when it refused to address McDaniel's
proposal of a substitute donation to charity).
48 Yott, 602 F2d at 909.
" See, e.g., Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F2d 1481, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1989)
(finding that the employer's compliance with Department of Transportation
regulations regarding drug use by truck drivers made it unreasonable to accommodate
the needs of a religious peyote smoker), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 940 (1990).
" See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 891 (3d Cir. 1990)
(finding that the employer-school district's compliance with the Pennsylvania Garb
Statute, which prohibits public-school teachers from wearing religious attire in the
classroom, was necessary to avoid exposure to criminal liability).
51 See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984)
(employer's compliance with standards promulgated by California's Occupational
Safety and Health Administration made it unreasonable to accommodate a man who
could not shave his beard for religious reasons).
52 On October 27, 1993, the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 97-3. See 139 CONG.
REC. S14,470 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993). On November 3, 1993, the House passed the
Senate version. See 139 CONG. REc. H8715 (daily ed. Nov. 3 1993).
53 See 139 CONG. REC. D1315 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993).
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of 1993 ("RFRA")." The Act responded to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith,55 a case in which the State
of Oregon denied unemployment benefits to the plaintiff, a member
of the Native American Church, because sacramental use of the drug
peyote56 was deemed by the State to constitute "work-related
'misconduct."'57 The Court, per Justice Scalia, applied a new First
Amendment test to Oregon's controlled substance law when it
examined the plaintiff's Free Exercise complaint." The Court held
that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect
of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by
a compelling governmental interest."5 Therefore, religion-neutral
laws need only surmount the rationality test to be affirmed. The
Court justified its decision by analyzing the haphazard application of
the compelling-interest test,60 and by considering the practical
ramifications of truly utilizing a compelling interest test6"-namely,
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 (1994).
55 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
16 Native American Church members "believe, and their sincerity has never been
at issue, that the peyote plant embodies their deity, and eating it is an act of worship
and communion. Without peyote, they could not enact the essential ritual of their
religion." Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 874.
58 Smith has been attacked as an effort ofjudicial overreaching-an instance where
the Court need not have addressed the criminality of ritualistic peyote use, since the
Oregon Supreme Court found the issue irrelevant as a matter of state unemployment
compensation law. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1114 (1990) ("The most important decision
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause in recent history, then, was rendered in a case
in which the question presented was entirely hypothetical, irrelevant to the disposition
of the case as a matter of state law, and neither briefed nor argued by the parties.").
51 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3. The Court has, however, retained a strict-scrutiny
analysis for laws not both religion-neutral and of general applicability. See Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2233-34 (1993)
(requiring a compelling municipal interest for, and applying a least-restrictive-means
analysis to, an ordinance with the purpose of banning religious animal sacrifice).
r0 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 ("The only decisions in which we have held that the
First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections ... ."). This
revisionistic examination of Free Exercise precedents, however, has been routinely
challenged in the academy. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 58, at 1120, 1125
(describing the Court's use of precedent as "troubling, bordering on the shocking"
and stating that "the primary and affirmative precedent marshalled by the Court to
support its decision consists entirely of overruled and minority positions."); Steven D.
Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 149, 234 (1991) ("As an exhibition of legal analysis, Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Smith is an intellectual disaster.").
"' See McConnell, supra note 58, at 1127 ("[T]he Supreme Court before Smith did
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the lawlessness that might result from carving exceptions from many
laws.
62
In response to the national uproar generated by Smith, Congress
enacted RFRA and restored the compelling-interest test to neutral
laws of general applicability," observing that such a test is "workable
... for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests."64 RFRA represented a
triumph of accommodationism-an interpretation of the Religion
not really apply a genuine 'compelling interest' test.").
62 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 ("To make an individual's obligation to obey such a
law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become
a law unto himself,'.. . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."
(citation omitted)). But see McConnell, supra note 58, at 1151 ("That the idea may be
anarchic does not mean we should dismiss it, for there is reason to believe that this
inalienable rights understanding [offreedom of conscience, protected by accommoda-
tions authorized by the First Amendment] is the genuine theory of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.").
61 The constitutionality of RFRA, so far as it usurps the Court's role as final
interpreter of the Constitution, has been hotly debated both in the academic
community, compare, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L REV. 437 (1994) with
Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Ac, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589 (1996) (defending the constitutionality of
RFRA), and in the courts, compare, e.g., Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F3d 1352 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding RFRA constitutional) with Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F3d 1545, 1557 (8th
Cir. 1996) (McMillian, J., dissenting) (finding RFRA unconstitutional). While most
courts have been able to dodge the issue of RFRA's constitutionality, see, e.g., Young
v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 82 F.3d 1407, 1417 (8th Cir. 1996); Thiry v.
Carlson, 78 F3d 1491, 1495 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996); Fawaad v.jones, 81 F.3d 1084, 1087
n.3 (l1th Cir. 1996), those circuits that have spent significant time addressing the
issue have found the statute to be a legitimate exercise of congressional expansion of
constitutional rights. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 469-71 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Flores, 73 F.3d
at 1364. For the purposes of this Comment, RFRA is presumed to be constitutional.
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (5) (1994).
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Clauses that requires, or at least encourages, the Government to
accommodate individuals' religious beliefs and exercise.
6 5
RFRA creates a federal claim for "persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government."66 The language
in RFRA could not be clearer:
(a) ...
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) ...
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person-
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel-
ling governmental interest.6"
RFRA, then, requires the courts to apply the compelling-interest
test in all instances-even though such a test was not always adopted,
or adopted rigorously, in pre-Smith case law.6s Instead, RFRA adopts
the position of those cases that rigorously applied the compelling-
interest test.
6 9
I See Arlin M. Adams & Sarah B. Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 318-19 (1988) (arguing that
accommodation is an "allowable governmental deference to the religious require-
ments of a pluralistic society"); see also McConnell, supra note 58, at 1111 (stating that
RFRA was the result of a drive for a legislative correction of the Smith decision led by
a "broad-based coalition of religious and civil liberties groups... and over a hundred
constitutional law scholars"); Laura S. Underkuffler, Discrimination' on the Basis of
Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 581, 625 (1989) ("Laws prohibiting religious discrimination in employment must
be interpreted in a manner that recognizes the legitimacy of religious values and
practice, and that targets the valid purpose of those laws: the eradication of barriers
to equal employment opportunity due to religious status discrimination.").
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2) (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (1994) ("A
person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may
assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government.").
6742 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (a) to 1(b) (1994).
s See supra note 61.
69 See42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1) (expressly naming Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)-two cases that adopted a
stringent compelling-interest test-as precedent to follow).
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B. RFRA and Employment Discrimination
At first glance, RFRA would appear to extend to the acts of
the federal and state Governments as employers, since the Govern-
ment may not substantially burden religious exercise without a
compelling interest; the statute does not distinguish legislative
acts from employment actions of public sector employers.70 Under
this reading, RFRA would replace the undue hardship test with the
much tougher compelling-interest test-making religious accommo-
dations prevalent in the public sector.71 But Congress did not
intend to affect Title VII, as the Senate Report states: "Nothing
in this act shall be construed as affecting religious accom-
modation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 72 As a
result, if one is to pay respect to the legislative history, RFRA
has no direct effect on religious accommodations in the work-
place.75
Rather than replacing the undue hardship test of Title VII
with the compelling-interest test, RFRA has a more subtle effect
on the workplace. As discussed above, employers may claim
undue hardship (or the equivalent, a lack of any reasonable
70 Congress enacted RFRA under its "authority to provide statutory protection for
a constitutional value when the Supreme Court has been unwilling to assert its
authority." H.R. RPp. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993). This authority is Article
I, Section Eight of the Constitution with respect to federal legislation, and Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to state legislation. See id.
Accordingly, since the state-action requirement remains, RFRA would not replace the
undue hardship test with one of compelling interest for private employers.
Title VII, however, reaches private employers because it is grounded in the
Commerce Clause. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g) (1994) (defining "commerce" as
interstate commerce for the purpose of Title VII). As a result, those employers who
do not participate in interstate commerce-presumed to be those employers with
fewer than 15 employees-fall outside the ambit of Title VII. See I SULLIvAN ET AL.,
supra note 31, § 1.3 (discussing the statutory definition of employer under Title VII).
71 A textualist might find, therefore, that RFRA replaces the de minimis-undue
hardship standard for public employers with a standard that requires a compelling
interest-economic or non-economic-before a public employer would bejustified in
failing to accommodate the religious employee.
S. REP. No. 111, supra note 22, at 13.
7- At least one court, however, has ignored the legislative history and has found
that RFRA does apply directly to Title VII. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
455, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that RFRA "has, in effect, incorporated a statutory
'compelling interest' test into Title VII"). Although such an interpretation has
uncertain effects for public employers, see supra note 70 and accompanying text, since
RFRA still requires state action, it does not directly modify the Title VII test with
respect to the duties of private employers to accommodate. Therefore, even if the
legislative history is ignored, the analysis for private employers' duties is the same as
that presented in the text.
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methods of accommodation) in two manners. First, the employer
may claim that accommodation poses a greater-than-de-minimis
economic burden. If RFRA does not directly affect Title VII,
then this standard is not changed, either for public or private
employers.
But, as discussed above in Part I.B, in Title VII suits employers
typically use compliance with federal or state laws and regulations as
a shield. If the employer invokes this defense and argues that it
would face civil or criminal liability for accommodating the employ-
ee, then an undue hardship undoubtedly exists.74 Historically,
those statutes relied upon by employees have presumptively-without
discussion-been considered valid; Title VII does not chip away at
other laws. RFRA upsets this balance. In short, it is the "clear and
express indication from Congress" that the Hardison Court sought. 5
RFRA creates a new cause of action: one which, after the
employee shows substantial interference with her right of free
exercise, places the burden on the employer, union, or intervenor-
Government to demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored
to further a compelling state interest.
76
In employment-discrimination cases, the typical scenario under
RFRA is as follows. The employee sues her employer under Title VII.
First, the employee shows that employment requirements imposed a
substantial burden on her bona fide religious beliefs." Such a
demonstration satisfies the employee's prima facie burdens under
both Title VII and RFRA; the ordinary Sabbatarian, for example, can
easily meet these requirements.7' If the employer can defend itself
with an economic rationale-by showing that accommodation would
require the payment of overtime or the hiring of another worker-
74 See United States v. Board of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 891 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[W]e
think it follows afortiori that it would be an undue hardship to require [an employer]
to violate an apparently valid criminal statute.").
11 TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). While RFRA does not directly state
that "seniority system[s] must give way when necessary to accommodate religious
observances," id. at 79, it does state, more generally, that all Government interference
must give way.
76 See, e.g., Werner v. McCotter, 49 .3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
shifting burdens of RFRA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995).
7 Cf Underkuffier, supra note 65, at 616 (arguing for a system in which "[t]he
issue.., should be whether the employee's employment opportunities are curtailed
because of his or her religious affiliation or identity").
78 See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 71-76 (recognizing that reasonable accommodation is
required under Title VII when a bona fide belief clashes with employment require-
ments); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (finding that Sabbatarianism
triggers the compelling interest requirement under the First Amendment).
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then, as stated above, RFRA does not apply. Should the employer,
however, defend its failure to accommodate on the basis of compli-
ance with a statute or regulation-if, for example, the employer
claims that but for compliance with the federal labor laws, accommo-
dation would not pose an undue hardship-RFRA enters the scene.
And RFRA mandates that the Government may not substantially
burden the employee's free exercise rights without a compelling
interest.79 Following the employer's claim of reliance on statutory
compliance, the district court may allow the Government to intervene
to defend the validity of the statute relied on by the employer.8 0 Ai
this point, the party defending the application of the statute-the
employer or the Government, should it intervene-has the burden
under RFRA of showing that the statute or regulation in question is
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling Government
interest. While RFRA does not modify the Title VII burdens,
employment discrimination actions provide a forum at which the
Government's interference with religious exercise can be questioned.
C. Reconciling Pre-RFRA Free Exercise Case Law
Although RFRA creates a statutory rather than constitutional
cause of action, RFRA seeks to achieve the same results that certain
pre-Smith Free Exercise cases reached. Those cases support the
interwoven relationship between Title VII and RFRA for which this
Comment argues. RFRA's express purpose is to restore Sherbert v.
Verners8 to law,82 and Sherbert, like the instant discussion, involved
" Cf Underkuffler, supra note 65, at 614 (positing that "[in] cases... in which
a nonreligious work environment... conflict[s] with an employee's religious require-
ments [the employee may assert] a claim of religious discrimination under a statute
that mandates an employer's accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs or
practices").
so The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit such intervention:
When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any
statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental
officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement or agreement
issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or
agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
"1 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1) (1994). The statute also cites Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972). In that case, the Court applied strict scrutiny to exempt the
Amish from mandatory formal education beyond the eighth grade. See id. at 215
("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.").
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employment law. In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was "discharged
by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on
Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith." s" South Carolina denied
the employee unemployment benefits because she was not "'able to
work"' and "'available to work"' as needed on Saturdays. 4 The
Court found that even if a compelling interest existed, the statute was
unconstitutional: "For even if the possibility of spurious claims did
threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it
would plainly be incumbent upon the appellee[] [state administra-
tors] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would
combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." 5
Perhaps more important to Title VII cases than the actual
holding of Sherbert was the Court's justification for reaching its
holding. The Court noted that the state law did not directly violate
the employee's free exercise rights; instead, the violation only
occurred because the employee would become compelled to work on
her Sabbath as a result of the unavailability of benefits:
In a sense the consequences of such a disqualification to religious
principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare
legislation within the State's general competence to enact; it is true
that no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-
day week. But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our
inquiry.
8 6
In Title VII cases, the substantial burden on the employee's free
exercise is also only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the
Government's general competence to enact. But, under Sherbert, this
indirectness does not bar the employee from relief under her RFRA
claim.
83 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 400 (quoting the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act).
I Id. at 407. Sherbert cannot be seen as a mere anomaly. The Court addressed the
interplay between unemployment benefits and free exercise three times after Sherbert
and each time struck down the unemployment-benefit statute. In Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), the Court, per ChiefJustice Burger, examined the denial
of unemployment benefits to aJehovah's Witness who terminated hisjob because "his
religious beliefs forbade participation in the production of armaments." Id. at 709.
The Court applied the same test as in Sherbert: "The state may justify an inroad on
religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest." Id. at 718; see also Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment
Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989) (reasserting the application of strict scrutiny review of
denials of unemployment benefits in a case factually similar to Sherbert); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (same).6Sherbert 374 U.S. at 403-04.
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Those pre-Smith cases at odds with Sherbert can be distinguished
from the circumstances currently arising in the Title VII context.8 7
Some Free Exercise cases are limited to military s or penological 9
contexts. In other cases, the Court was reluctant to require accom-
modation without explicit congressional guidance for fear that such
accommodation would handcuff the legislature in its efforts to
achieve its desired goals. In Braunfeld v. Brown,9 ° for example, the
Court upheld Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law as applied to
Orthodox Jewish retailers who claimed they would be forced out of
business by continued enforcement of the law.91  In applying
rational basis review, the Court, anomalously, seemed to require strict
scrutiny to strike down the law:
To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which
imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion ...
would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature ....
[I] t cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact
no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an
economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others
because of the special practices of the various religions.
9 2
87 While RFRA is meant to "guarantee [the] application [of the compelling-
interest test] in all cases where free exercise is substantially burdened," 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b)(1), the analysis in the text accompanying this footnote is meant to
distinguish cases where, if the compelling-interest test was applied (and it is not clear
that it was), it was not applied faithfully.
I See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("Our review of military
regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."). In
1986, Congress responded to the Goldman decision by overturning it. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 774 (1994) (declaring, subject to certain exceptions, that "a member of the armed
forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the
member's armed force"). RFRA applies as equally to military claims as to other
claims. See S. REP. No. 111, supra note 22, at 12 ("Under the unitary standard set
forth in the act, courts will review the free exercise claims of military personnel under
the compelling governmental interest test.").
I See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987) (disregarding the
Third Circuit opinion that placed the burden on the state to show that security risks
would be implicated if the prisoners' religious rights were accommodated, and
applying the far more deferential rational relationship test where the penological
interest of security is implicated). RFRA, however, appears to restore the Third
Circuit's test in Shabazz. SeeJolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.d 468, 475 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
legislative history of RFRA makes clear that the compelling interest test is to apply to
free exercise claims by prison inmates."); S. REP. No. 111, supra note 22, at 11 ("The
act would return to a standard that was employed without hardship to the prisons in
several circuits prior to the OLone decision.").
go 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
91 See id. at 605.
92 Id. at 606; see also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) ("The tax
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This concern is irrelevant under RFRA, however, since RFRA-
overruling the similar concerns articulated in Smith-is meant to
restrict the legislature's operating latitude. 3
Other cases can be distinguished by virtue of the extent of
interference with free exercise caused by the Government.9 4 In
United States v. Lee,95 the Court upheld application of the Social
Security tax to Amish employers of other Amish, even after accepting
the contention that the tax violated Amish beliefs.96 It is not clear
that such an interference would rise to the level of a "substantial
burden" as required by RFRA. In the same vein, it is uncertain
whether free exercise is substantially burdened by the racial
integration of a religious organization,97 by the government's use of
a Social Security number,98 or by timber-harvesting and road-
building near (but not on) Native American tribes' sites of wor-
ship.99 In contrast, Title VII cases present a clear conflict: a "cruel
choice" for the employee between religion and employment. °0 0 In
imposed on employers to support the social security system must be uniformly
applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise.").
9 The Court in Sherbert distinguished Braunfeld on different grounds, finding that
a day of leisure could be a compelling interest, and that exemptions might undermine
that interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963).
" The examination of the centrality of a religious belief is admittedly a difficult
undertaking, and more so for the Government than for the author. Nonetheless, this
analysis is necessary because of the "substantial burden" requirement of RFRA, and
because it demonstrates that application of RFRA to Title VII cases is particularly
important. Furthermore, this undertaking has been sanctioned by the Court. See
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706 (1986) (distinguishing incidental burdens from those
where "governmental action or legislation ... compels conduct that some find
objectionable for religious reasons").
9 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
The Court explained:
The Amish believe that there is a religiously based obligation to provide for
their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the social
security system.... Because the payment of the taxes or receipt of benefits
violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the social
security system interferes with their free exercise rights.
Id. at 257.
11 See BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983) ("Denial of tax
benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious
schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets.").
91 See Bowen v. Ray, 476 U.S. 693, 700-01 (finding no interference with a child's
"'freedom to believe, express, and exercise' his religion") (citations omitted).
11 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449
(1988) ("[Tlhe affected individuals [would not] be coerced by the Government's
action into violating their religious beliefs ....").
110 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox Jew to choose between
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Title VII cases, government legislation would compel conduct the
employee finds objectionable on religious grounds.'
01
The combination of a free-exercise claim with a Title VII claim
had seldom been attempted before RFRA. °2 In United States v.
Board of Education,"3 a Muslim schoolteacher sued the Philadelphia
School Board under Title VII for firing her for wearing to school,
pursuant to her religious beliefs, a head scarf and long loose
dress. 10 4  Because the School Board defended its decision on its
compliance with Pennsylvania's Garb Statute, the teacher challenged
the Garb Statute on a Free Exercise Clause basis.'0 5 As against the
School Board, the court found:
From the inception of this case, the School Board has insisted that
it had no choice but to comply with the Garb Statute.... For the
Board to have accommodated Ms. Reardon, it would have been
required to expose its administrators to a substantial risk of criminal
prosecution, fines, and expulsion from the profession. This, the
Board insists, would have been an undue hardship on it .... We
agree.1
06
Having found that the School Board was entitled to comply with
a valid criminal law, the court examined the Free Exercise grounds
and found that the statute "advance [d] a compelling interest in
maintaining the appearance of religious neutrality in the public
school classroom."0 7  Since the Garb Statute was targeted at
his religious faith and his economic survival. That is a cruel choice. It is a choice
which I think no State can constitutionally demand.").
101 See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449; Bowen, 476 U.S. at 706.
102 In a broader context, one commentator has explained:
Despite the visibility of the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of
religion and its prohibition against establishment of religion by the govern-
ment, in employment cases it is invoked with far less frequency than Title
VII as a direct source of legal protection. There are two reasons for this.
First, the First Amendment does not generally restrict private employers[,
and s]econd, Title VII['s] ... depth and comprehensiveness... may make
a purely constitutional claim unappealing by comparison.
3 LARSON, supra note 36, § 55.08 (citation omitted).
103 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990).
104 See id. at 884. Technically, the Department ofJustice brought suit on behalf of
the teacher. See id. at 885. Title VII requires referral of an employee's complaint
from the EEOC to the Attorney General when instituting suit against government
entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).
"05 See Board of Educ., 911 F.2d at 884.
106 Id. at 890.
107 Id. at 889. Clearly, the State could not be forced to violate the Establishment
Clause by accommodating the employee. Instead, the Third Circuit found that the
State's interest in preserving an atmosphere of religious neutrality in the classroom
could be compelling, even without a showing that such accommodation would violate
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eliminating the appearance of religion in classrooms, accommodation
would have eviscerated the statute.
Unlike the Garb Statute, nearly all legislation challenged under
Title VII is face-neutral toward religion." 8 Accordingly, accommo-
dation will not directly conflict with the legislative purposes embod-
ied in the legislation. Instead, the party defending the validity of the
statute-the employer or the intervenor Government-would be
required to show that accommodations would compromise the non-
religious purpose of the statute; if unable to do so, the statute would
not be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the legislative
purpose.
III. CHALLENGING THE "BURDENSOME" STATUTE: SENIORITY
PROVISIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
TWA v. Hardison, itself, dealt with seniority provisions of collective
bargaining agreements. "In the unionized workplace, seniority is
purely a contractual concept, created and defined by the collective
bargaining agreement. "19 Over ninety percent of collective
bargaining agreements contain seniority provisions. 0  These
provisions prevent junior-level employees from being transferred to
jobs or schedules which conflict with their religious practices.
Because "[u] nions prize seniority provisions above almost any other
part of the collective bargaining agreement,""' an employer who
the Establishment Clause. See id. at 889 n.5.
11 The vitality of the compelling-interest test for non-face-neutral legislation has
never been in doubt. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113
S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993) (noting that non-neutral legislation "is invalid unless it is
justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest").
Such legislation is rare as a result. The typical laws which conflict with an employee's
free exercise, as I have suggested, are face-neutral, however, and include labor and
public-safety laws.
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(1994). The collective bargaining agreement, while contractual in nature, is
"enmeshed in a framework of regulatory laws-in part state law but always against the
background of federal labor legislation." ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR
LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 541 (1976). The background of
federal labor legislation of which Professor Gorman writes is largely federal common
law. In Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, the
Supreme Court found that section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act
"authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
these collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 451.
1 See COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 109, 109, at 162.
na Id.; see also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 570 n.4
(1984) ("Seniority has traditionally been, and continues to be, a matter of great
concern to American workers.").
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would like to accommodate a Sabbatarian, for example, will often not
get the union's permission.1 2
Because RFRA creates an independent cause of action, rather
than one derived from Title VII, it does not suffer from the same
infirmity as did the plaintiff's claim in Hardison, namely Title VII's
allowance of seniority provisions absent proof of discriminatory
intent."' The instant requirement is derived from section 708(h)
of Title VII, which states that neutral seniority provisions are not an
"unlawful employment practice.""' The RFRA claimant does not
argue that the collective bargaining contract violates Title VII, but
that the employer's invocation of federal labor law violates the
statutory protections of RFRA." 5 Title VII remains unchanged, but
RFRA affects those other laws-including the federal common law
that enforces collective bargaining agreements" 6-directed to the
workplace.
Accommodation from the seniority provisions does not under-
mine the government's compelling interest in regulating the
relationship between employers and organized labor. The harm to
the union will usually be temporary-in Hardison, the employee
would have achieved the necessary seniority in a matter of months to
avoid having to work on his Sabbath."7 Furthermore, the harm to
the union caused by occasional scheduling adjustments would not
burden the union any more than the union's loss of dues from any
one member." 8 Accommodating the religious employee would not
112 See, e.g., TWA v. Hardison, 482 U.S. 63, 63 (1977).
13 See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 908 (1989)
("[Olur cases... treat the proof of discriminatory intent as a necessary element of
Title VII actions challenging seniority systems.").
114 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994); see also, e.g., Loranc, 490 U.S. at 908 (explaining
the Court's interpretation of § 703(h)).
15 While it might seem unusual to override Title VII's presumption of legality, the
result is mandated by RFRA. The cause of action under RFRA, though factually
intertwined with the Title VII complaint, is legally distinct. Under RFRA, the
employee may directly attack the validity of the labor law. Title VII's statement that
neutral bargaining agreements are permissible cannot abrogate the requirement in
an employee's separate RFRA claim that such agreements be the least restrictive
means of satisfying a compelling government interest.
16 See supra note 109.
117 Permanent situations, though, might create greater-than-de-minimis economic
costs. These economic costs, however, are outside of RFRA and the Free Exercise
Clause because of the lack of state action. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
118 See, e.g., Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir.) ("The
Steelworkers have not established that the 'substituted charity' accommodation, as
applied here, will deprive the union of monies necessary for its maintenance or
operation."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers, 643
RESTORING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
appear to compromise the effectiveness of the union as a bargaining
unit-hence it would not undermine the purposes of federal labor
laws. It would violate RFRA, then, for the government to throw its
weight behind the union and declare the employer's accommodation
an unfair labor practice. Although it is true that this regime prefers
the religious reasons for shift changes to the non-religious,"1 RFRA
embodies Congress's accommodationist interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause. Such an interpretation by nature favors religious




The implications of RFRA extend to every aspect of government
regulation that burdens religion. In enacting RFRA, Congress has
sent a mandate that none of its laws, nor the laws of the States, may
substantially burden free exercise. It is only appropriate then, that
RFRA, a statute meant to effectively overturn Supreme Court
F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir.) ("Because a religious objector under a charity-substitute
accommodation bears the same financial burden as his coworkers, he is not ...
seeking something for nothing, and the diversion of his contribution to a charity
rather than the Union does not of itself make the accommodation unfair or unreason-
able as a matter of law."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1046 (1981); Burns v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978) ("In our view, the loss of dues [in the
amount of $19 per month] to the Union is de minimis, even if so necessary to its fiscal
well-being that its equivalent would be collected from the Local's 300 members at a
rate of 2 cents each per month."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); cf. Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (holding that trial courts may assign
seniority rights to victims of an employer's illegal conduct).
119 See 3 LARSON, supra note 36, § 56.03 [1] (finding co-employee discrimination-
discrimination against other employees whose shift preferences were based on non-
religious reasons-to be the primary rationale of Hardison).
120 See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (observing that Title VII does not violate the Establishment Clause);
cf. Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.) (noting that the
Sabbatarian employee's demand for all Saturdays off from work was within the realm
of reasonable-and constitutional-accommodation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986);
EEOC v Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (same).
Since the low de minimis threshold remains for economic burdens faced by the
employer, RFRA, in connection with Title VII, does not violate the Establishment
Clause. Cf Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 E3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that
RFRA does not violate the Establishment Clause since "'it is a permissible legislative
purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference' with the exercise of
religion" (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335
(1987))); Thornton, 472 U.S. at 703 (holding that a Connecticut statute violated the
Establishment Clause because employers were forced to accommodate without regard
to the burden or inconvenience on them).
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precedent affecting the Government's disbursement of unemploy-
ment benefits, would also help prevent the employee from losing her
job and from needing unemployment benefits at all.
